Eleven weeks into what has become the world's longest nationwide internet shutdown, Iran is not moving toward restoring open access - it is building a permanent architecture of controlled, stratified connectivity. President Masoud Pezeshkian this week established a new state body to coordinate cyberspace governance, but digital rights experts say the move consolidates existing restrictions rather than dismantling them. More than 90 million Iranians remain cut off from the global internet, a blackout that began on February 28 following the outbreak of war with the United States and Israel.
A New Body With Old Mandates
The newly created Specialised Headquarters for Organising and Guiding Iran's Cyberspace will be led by First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, a 74-year-old figure considered relatively moderate within Iran's political establishment. Pezeshkian tasked Aref with eliminating duplication among the multiple bodies that oversee communications policy, and with reviewing the mandate and efficiency of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace - the powerful institution established by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2012 that has driven the country's internet restrictions.
The framing of the announcement carries the language of reform. But digital security expert Amir Rashidi, speaking to Al Jazeera, was unambiguous about its limits. The new headquarters can, at most, provide better coordination in implementing existing policies set by the Supreme Council. Fundamental change to those policies, he said, is not on the table. The political will to enforce tiered access - long present in policy documents but previously lacking in execution - now exists and is moving forward rapidly.
The Supreme Council's current secretary, Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, has been the architect of the harshest restrictions. Notably, when Science Minister Hossein Simaei Saraf wanted the US National Library of Medicine's database PubMed unblocked for Iranian researchers, he bypassed both the president and the communications minister to write directly to Aghamiri. The database was restored within days - a telling illustration of where real authority over the internet resides.
Tiered Access as State Architecture
While most Iranians access only a slow domestic intranet supporting state-approved local applications, the Supreme National Security Council has launched a paid service called "Internet Pro" that offers slightly expanded access. Telegram, WhatsApp and ChatGPT are accessible through the platform; YouTube and the vast majority of international services remain blocked. The service is officially designated for businesses, university professors, lawyers, and other categories the state deems eligible - but state-linked entities have been reselling access at multiples of the official price.
Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei this week acknowledged the inconsistencies in Internet Pro's rollout, describing it as a "sledgehammer that descends on public opinion", while simultaneously warning that violations of internet law would be prosecuted. The contradiction is not incidental - it reflects a system in which surveillance and access control are the design, not a side effect.
Rashidi traces the origins of this model to November 2019, when Iran imposed its first near-total internet shutdown during deadly nationwide protests. That week-long blackout - the most severe state-imposed internet disruption recorded at the time - became a proof of concept. Policies formally endorsed by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace in its aftermath have now, under wartime conditions, found their full expression.
The Costs the Government Cannot Ignore
The economic and institutional damage accumulating from the shutdown is no longer abstract. Science Minister Saraf stated publicly last week that the internet disruption has already harmed the country's scientific and research communications, and said its continuation poses a risk to national security - a direct rebuke, using the government's own security language, of the rationale used to justify the blackout.
An anonymous Tehran-based cybersecurity expert told Al Jazeera the shutdown has inflicted more harm on Iran than it has prevented through defence against cyberattacks or hostile operations. Meanwhile, Information and Communications Technology Minister Sattar Hashemi pointed to a different metric: local messaging applications including Baleh and Eita have collectively reached a user base of 100 million. These apps, many of which lack strong encryption or independent security protocols, have become the default infrastructure for government and judiciary services - concentrating civilian communications on platforms that Iranian authorities are positioned to monitor directly.
Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, pressed by reporters at a Tehran news conference on Tuesday, deflected questions about the shutdown by citing the state of ceasefire negotiations and the logic of wartime security. Authorities have pledged to restore open internet access when the war ends. There is, at present, no indication of when that will be. For Iranians relying on VPNs - often expensive, frequently disrupted, and now actively hunted by security forces alongside illegal Starlink connections - the gap between what officials promise and what citizens experience is measured not in policy language but in daily, compounding deprivation.
